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Introduction and Purpose1
 The following quote is taken from an amicus brief 
submitted to United States Supreme Court as part of the 
Seattle and Louisville school desegregation cases2:
A recent report found that “very few states are 
placing more than half their LIHTC family 
units… in census tracts with lower minority 
population rates than the metropolitan area 
average.”  In both the Seattle and Louisville 
metropolitan areas, with minority population 
shares of approximately 24%and 18%, 
respectively, more than 68% of LIHTC 
family units were located in census tracts 
with greater than average minority population 
shares between 1995 and 2003.
 The report cited is Are States Using the Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit to Enable Families with 
Children to Live in Low Poverty and Racially Integrated 
Neighborhoods? (2006),3 referred to herein as the 
“Report”; it was prepared by Abt Associates, Inc. for the 
Poverty and Race Research Action Council and National 
Fair Housing Alliance.
 The advocacy groups responsible for the amicus 
brief, and others who use the Report for similar purposes,4 
have a problem: the analysis is not adequate to support 
its conclusions.  The unfortunate necessity served by this 
article is an explanation of these shortcomings.
 Ideally for everyone involved, the basis for the 
advocates’ charges could remain unchallenged.  Every 
year the state and local agencies that allocate LIHTCs 
(“allocating agencies”) actively solicit criticism of their 
policies.  Even small jurisdictions receive many dozens of 
comments annually.  None of these statements, no matter 
how negative, merits a 2,500 word published response.
 But the claims of these advocacy groups are 
fundamentally different, and the potential stakes are 
higher.  A full explanation of their agenda is beyond the 
scope of this article (although it is readily available on 
the Internet).5  In summary, their goal is to make the case 
that allocating agencies’ administration of LIHTCs does 
not comply with federal law. 6
 The advocates’ hoped-for remedial measures include 
additional mandates from Congress, the Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”), and Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”).  These new requirements could 
have unintended negative consequences for allocators, 
properties, and residents.7  Other interested parties do 
not claim illegality in their comments and almost never 
seek additional federal impositions.
 A more important reason for not describing the 
advocates’ position here is that this article does not prove 
the absence of the problems they claim exist.  Rather, 
its purpose is to raise the level of dialogue.  Without 
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these comments, the Report would be the last word on 
this issue.  In reality it’s barely a beginning.  Advocates 
and agencies actually have a great deal in common, but 
inaccurate and unfair characterizations such as those 
in the Report impede progress towards shared goals. 
Balanced, fact-based discussions are a prerequisite to 
meaningful change.
Background on LIHTCs and the Report
 A proper description of LIHTCs is even further 
beyond the scope of this article, but fortunately there 
are many descriptions available on the Internet.8  The 
following is a much abbreviated summary:
• The governing statute is the Internal Revenue 
Code and the federal administrator is the IRS (not 
HUD).
• Allocating agencies are responsible for 
implementing the program, including allocation 
and compliance.  The rules for these processes are 
contained in Qualiﬁed Allocation Plans.9
• Large institutional investors place equity into 
qualified properties.  For example, a 56 unit 
property generates $4,700,000 in credits over 
10 years.  In exchange for this dollar-for-dollar 
reduction in tax liability, the investor provides 
$4 million in equity (amounts vary).  This covers 
approximately 70 percent of the costs and greatly 
reduces the amount of debt ﬁnancing necessary.
• Units are rented (none are owner-occupied).  To be 
eligible for LIHTCs, units must be affordable to 
and occupied by households at 60 percent of area 
median income.
• Each year LIHTCs are awarded to build or 
rehabilitate 130,000 units across the country, and 
there are over 2 million nationwide.10
 The Report attempts to identify the extent to which 
states are using LIHTCs to develop family housing in 
low poverty and racially integrated portions of large 
metropolitan areas.  To answer these questions, the 
authors geocoded projects with two or more bedrooms 
that were placed in service between 1995 and 2003.11
The Report’s deﬁnition of metropolitan areas is those 
with populations greater than 250,000, and a low poverty 
neighborhood is a census tract in which fewer than 10 
percent of the residents live in households with incomes 
below the poverty line.12  For their analysis of racial 
patterns, the authors compared “the minority population 
rates of the locations of LIHTC family housing within 
each state’s large metropolitan areas to average minority 
population rates for those areas.”13
 Based on these assumptions, the Report has reached 
conclusions such as the following: “Patterns within 
regions show that some states appear to focus on [using 
LIHTCs in low poverty areas] considerably more than do 
adjacent states.”14  Five states are identiﬁed as performing 
poorly for concentrating both race and poverty.15
Problems with the Report
 The following are the most important limitations 
in the Report’s analysis:
1. Including rehabilitated units
 The Report uses words such as “placed,” “located,” 
or “produced” to describe how allocating agencies 
have used LIHTCs in areas of concentration. 16  These 
words clearly imply newly constructed projects that 
increase an area’s population.  Of course that is not just 
an implication but inherent to the advocates’ claim that 
allocating agencies are exacerbating the problems of 
concentration.
 However, in making their calculations, the authors 
do not differentiate between creating new units and 
rehabilitating existing ones.  According to the Report, 
apartments that have been occupied for decades are 
“placed,” “located,” or “produced” in concentrated areas 
because of using LIHTCs to make physical improvements. 
In other words, replacing cabinets in a 100 unit project 
is counted as having the same effect on concentration as 
building new housing for 100 families.
 Not only is this methodology counterintuitive, 
it skews the results.17  Over half of the LIHTC units 
placed in service between 1995 and 2003 in the Seattle 
metropolitan statistical area (“MSA”), and nearly 40 
percent of those in Louisville, were in pre-existing 
projects rehabilitated using LIHTCs.
 Even a pro-rata split between new construction 
and rehabilitation would reduce the 68 percent “located” 
ﬁgure cited in the amicus brief down to 32 percent 
and 41 percent, respectively.18  But the distribution of 
allocations to new and rehabilitation projects is generally 
not pro-rata; the latter are more likely to be in areas 
of concentration.  Indeed, many of the properties that 
are being physically improved with LIHTCs already 
contribute to the low-income concentration.
 Therefore the percentage of units actually added 
to areas of concentration in these two cities may be even 
less than the percentage of the MSA population that is 
minority.  At a minimum, the problem these advocates 
identify and subsequently present to the Supreme Court 
is substantially less severe than indicated.
 The effect of not distinguishing new construction 
units from rehabilitated ones runs throughout the Report. 
Of the ﬁve states critiqued for performance in both 
poverty and race, 56 percent of the total units covered 
are in rehabilitated projects. 
 The ﬁrst three jurisdictions listed in the following 
table are particularly compelling.  The Report critiques 
the work of these allocating agencies as exacerbating 
the problems of concentration, when in fact less than 
20 percent of all LIHTC units were newly constructed. 
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The remaining housing was already there, and now the 
residents have an improved physical environment.
 Furthermore, a substantial proportion of the new 
units may have been built outside of concentrated 
areas.  One researcher reached that very conclusion:
By and large, the program seems to be 
placing LIHTC new construction units in 
low-poverty tracts in at least roughly the 
same proportion as all LIHTC units, and 
most states are placing a disproportionate 
share of their LIHTC new construction units 
in low-poverty tracts.19
 Lastly, the advocates’ premise also fails to 
account for the intrinsic value of rehabilitation: making 
existing conditions better and ensuring that affordable 
apartments are not lost to deterioration or market forces.20 
Preservation can only occur where the properties exist, 
not where theorists may prefer they exist.
2. Not counting the net effect of replacement housing
 During the time period of the Report’s analysis, 
federal, state and local governments have redeveloped a 
large amount of distressed subsidized housing.  HOPE VI 
is the largest single program for redevelopment and is 
typical of the most frequent pattern: replacing obsolete 
apartments with mixes of incomes (i.e. from zero-income 
to market rate), tenures (i.e. rental and ownership), and 
uses (i.e. residential and commercial).  The federal 
investment has been substantial:
Since 1992, HUD has awarded 446 
HOPE VI grants in 166 cities. To date, 
63,100 severely distressed units have 
been demolished and another 20,300 
units are slated for redevelopment.21
 The eventual outcome is almost always a reduction 
in the number of low-income households in the immediate 
vicinity.  Indeed, one of the ofﬁcial goals of the HOPE VI 
program is “[l]essening concentrations of poverty by 
placing public housing in nonpoverty neighborhoods 
and promoting mixed-income communities.”22
 Another of HUD’s goals for HOPE VI is to leverage 
other resources.  As a result, three-fourths of HOPE VI 
project phases involve LIHTCs.23  (Some of the other 
phases are for homeownership and thus not eligible 
for LIHTCs.)  The work of the housing authority in 
Louisville ﬁts this description.  In 1996, HUD awarded 
$20 million to redevelop over 700 units of public 
housing.  An aspect of this work was to build at least 
300 new LIHTC units.24  There is little doubt that all of 
these new units were located in areas of concentration.
 As a result, the Report counts the 300 LIHTC 
apartments as “placed,” “located,” or “produced” in 
areas of concentration, when they are in fact partially or 
completely replacing over 700 units of public housing. 
The reality is a net reduction of approximately 400 units 
for low-income families.  This housing represents 17 
percent of the new construction counted in the Report. 
Removing both these 300 HOPE VI tax credit units and 
the rehabilitated units described in the preceding section 
would reduce the true ﬁgure in the amicus brief to 33 
percent – a far cry from the advocates’ 68 percent as 
derived from the Report’s analysis.
 The analytical consequences of not addressing 
replacement housing may be even more pronounced for 
other parts of the country.  The ﬁve jurisdictions cited 
by the report were awarded $588 million in HOPE VI 
between 1993 and 2002.  Calculating the net reduction 
due to redevelopment would have required a great 
deal of time and additional data (unlike accounting for 
rehabilitated units). However the authors should have 
clearly noted this limitation as a caveat to the Report’s 
conclusions.  Failure to do so was a problematic 
omission.
3. Available and appropriate sites
 There are three related factors outside the control 
of LIHTC allocating agencies that contribute to creating 
concentrations.  They are functions of federal law, local 
decisions, and the marketplace.
 Land is a major factor in siting LIHTC projects 
since its cost is not subsidized.25  Dollars spent on land 
must be covered by loans, and tenant rent pays the 
resulting debt service.  Thus, higher land costs mean 
reduced cash ﬂow and/or less affordability (each to the 
extent allowed under program rules).  Since the market 
value of land generally has a negative correlation with 
the percent of area households in poverty, the inherent 
math of project feasibility encourages sites in low-income 
areas.
 Finding real estate that is not too expensive for 
affordable housing is only part of a developer’s challenge. 
Uses permitted under local land regulations are another. 
Higher income neighborhoods often object to any type of 
apartment development, let alone those for low-income 
families.  The political reality in some jurisdictions is that 
LIHTC projects can be sited either in areas of relative 
poverty or not at all.
 Regardless of land costs and uses allowed by 
Location Rehab Total Percent
D.C. 6,248 6,725 92.9%
Massachusetts 13,714 17,278 79.4%
Connecticut 4,192 5,700 73.5%
Illinois 10,241 22,820 44.9%
Arizona 1,489 11,539 12.9%
TOTAL 35,884 64,062 56.0%
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zoning, not all areas of a city make sense for low-
income rental housing.  Residents of LIHTC projects 
need convenient access to employment, mass transit, 
shopping, amenities, and services at least to the same 
extent as occupants of market-rate apartments, if not 
more so.  This consideration is even more important 
for particular targeted populations, such as the formerly 
homeless.  Locations that work well from a practical, 
real estate perspective simply are more likely to be in 
census tracts with higher densities and higher poverty, 
not in rural areas or sprawling suburbs.
 Finally, even if none of the above were factors, the 
preference of particular project sponsors often drives 
the location of LIHTC projects.  Many developers are 
community-based nonproﬁt organizations that include 
housing as part of an overall mission of service.  While 
a good nonproﬁt can add value anywhere, many see a 
greater opportunity to have an impact in low-income 
neighborhoods.  As a result they are more likely to 
undertake projects in areas of concentration.26  One 
commentator recognizes that following the advocates’ 
agenda means “the structure of many community 
development corporations would need to change.”27 
4. Statutory preference for Qualiﬁed Census Tracts
 The federal law governing LIHTCs has two 
related provisions that actually have the effect of 
increasing concentrations; both involve housing located 
in Qualiﬁed Census Tracts (“QCT”).  Census tracts 
become “Qualiﬁed” if at least half or more of households’ 
incomes are less than 60 percent of the area median gross 
income or if the poverty rate is at least 25 percent.28
 The ﬁrst incentive is ﬁnancial: projects in QCTs 
may generate up to 30 percent more LIHTC equity.  The 
effect is to reduce the amount of debt ﬁnancing, which 
in turn increases cash ﬂow and makes the project more 
feasible and attractive to developers.  The public beneﬁt 
is lower rents and deeper income targeting.
 The other provision is regulatory: allocating 
agencies must give preference to projects that contribute 
to a community revitalization plan and are located in a 
QCT.29  Therefore, all else being equal, an application 
meeting these criteria will be funded over a competing 
proposal outside of a QCT.
 These aspects of the IRS Code have the same effect 
on the location of LIHTC projects as the lack of subsidy 
for land costs.  All are functions of how Congress created 
the LIHTC program, as opposed to choices made by state 
or local policy makers.
Conclusion
 Allocating agencies agree with the advocates’ 
fundamental goal of deconcentration. However, being 
experienced practitioners means learning that actions 
based on good intentions sometimes lead to negative 
unintended consequences.  The following are possible 
outcomes of policies that could be adopted in response 
to the Report:
• not rehabilitating units for low-income residents;
• not participating in community redevelopment 
efforts;
• awarding projects that are less affordable due to 
high land costs;
• substantially increasing developers’ challenges in 
ﬁnding sites;
• diminishing the role of community-based nonproﬁts; 
and
• in general, not building new apartments in jurisdictions 
with a serious need for affordable housing.
 Any of these would be unfortunate, particularly if 
premised on incomplete or faulty analysis.
 One of the primary reasons for the Report’s 
shortcomings is a lack of communication with 
allocating agency staff, which is a frequent phenomenon 
among academic researchers.  The process of LIHTC 
administration is extremely complex and difficult 
to understand.  Failure to directly engage those who 
implement the program will almost invariably result in 
debatable analysis.
 Replacing the current one-sided critique with a 
cooperative, constructive dialogue is the best way to reach 
common goals.  Advocates should take the approach of 
others who seek policy changes: reach out in good faith 
to program administrators, express concerns, listen to 
responses, and try to understand states’ limitations.
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